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To understand a text, a reader must use more than the individual words on 
a page. Readers integrate general knowledge in long-term memory with the written 
message to form a unified, coherent representation of text (Graesser, Singer, & 
Trabasso, 1994; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). There are multiple codes for mental 
representations. Language is only one such code, others being imagery, direct 
procedural representations, episodic representations, emotion, and so on. 
Theoretically, these representations can be embedded within one another or 
recoded to another form of representation to account for the complexity of thought. 
Even imagery and emotion are to be represented propositionally, not because they 
are by nature propositional, but for practical reasons. 
For example, when one reads a story, individual words and sentences 
would be converted mentally into propositions and connected with each other 
through overlapping information or reference (e.g., pronouns) into a text base. 
These propositions would then be combined into macropropositions that defined 
the theme or gist of the story or some portion of it (e.g., goal, attempt, outcome). 
The macrorules that governed the combination of micropropositions into these 
macropropositional structures would emanate from a schema of some kind (e.g., 
story grammar).  
 
Models of comprehension 
There is wide agreement that text comprehension results in multiple levels 
of representation or codes. The levels include the representations of surface form; 
of the idea network, or "textbase"; and of the situations to which the text refers (van 
Dijk & Kintsch, 1983).  
a. The first code was verbatim text information or surface code. The surface 
code is a record of the exact wording and syntax of the sentences. This surface 
code is preserved in memory for only a few seconds when technical text is read. 
Some information is remembered exactly or nearly exactly as given (e.g., the 
names of characters or places in a story).  
 
b. The second code was the propositional text base. Just what is a 
proposition, anyway? Propositions are not seen as actual language; they have no 
form and are assumed to be the abstract, mental, meaning base of language. They 
cannot be experienced directly, have no objective reality, and are associated with 
no sensory modality (a description that also applies to schemata). A proposition is 
assumed to be composed of a predicate plus its arguments in the manner of case 
grammar. The predicate is typically a verb and the arguments are its agents (i.e., 
subject, object, and so on). The textbase is preserved in memory for several 
minutes or longer. 
To illustrate a proposition, let us use an example. The sentences „John gave 
Marcel a map” and “A map was given to Marcel by John” would presumably share 
a common, underlying, proposition: (gave, was given) [agent: John, object: book, 
goal: Marcel]. The notation (gave, was given) denotes alternate surface structure 
forms; different syntactic arrangements can also be applied. Concepts like (gave, 
was given) are in turn defined by other associated concepts in the knowledge 
network such as the superordinate categories gift or transaction, the property 
transfer possession, and so on. These concepts are also in propositional form. 
Keep in mind that what are being presented on this page are not propositions but 
their surface structure notation, much as we diagram sentences in other ways. 
What is missing so far is an explanation of how we go from actual printed language 
or its linguistic notation to its abstracted, amodal, propositional, mental form.  
The theory's answer to this question is that we have a schema for the 
proposition, a mental program composed of a predicate slot and argument slots. 
That is, the theory assumes a general, abstract schema for forming atomic 
propositions that is instantiated by reading each unit of a text. Furthermore, the 
theory proposes that there are script-propositions for the construction of emergent 
scripts, propositional schemata for generating propositional schemata that are 
presumably instantiated by instantiating the atomic proposition-schema. The layers 
of abstraction here are troubling.  
These assumptions also seem to produce a contradiction in the theory. 
Schemata, in the form of prior knowledge structures such as story grammars or 
scripts, are rejected, but a propositional schema is accepted as the unit of thought 
and as a device for forming emergent scripts. The theory argues that prior 
knowledge structures, like scripts, are inflexible and insensitive to context while a 
predicate-argument schema is not limiting and can be constructed online. But why 
is a schema needed at the most basic level? Why not just a set of activated 
associations constrained by context at this level as well?  
c. A third code was added and called the situation model. The situation 
model was not seen as part of the representation of the text proper but a mental 
representation constructed by each reader about the situation in the text (e.g., 
persons, actions, events). The form of the situation model was not specified, but 
 
Perrig & Kintsch (1985) later proposed that the situation model could take the form 
of either a well-integrated text base or mental imagery. The situation model would 
contain causal chains of events that unfold as the key unlocks the door, a visual 
spatial image of the parts of the lock, and the goals of the person who uses the 
lock. The construction of an adequate situation model requires a sufficient amount 
of relevant world knowledge, such as general knowledge about locks and 
mechanical equipment. Deep comprehension consists of the construction of this 
referential situation model, whereas shallow comprehension is limited to the 
surface code and textbase. The situation model is retained in memory much longer 
than the textbase and the surface code, assuming that the comprehender has 
adequate world knowledge to build a situation model (Graesser, et al., 2002). 
A major revision of the theory soon followed that dealt more deeply with 
prior knowledge use (Kintsch, 1988). The theory was modified into a two-stage, 
construction-integration model (CI).  
The verbatim code, propositional code, and situation model code were 
retained, but the notion of schemata or any other stable prior knowledge structures 
in memory was eliminated. Instead, a loose associative network of prior knowledge 
was assumed in which there were stronger and weaker positive and negative 
connections between a vast array of concepts (i.e., propositions in memory). As a 
word or phrase is visually processed in a text, its many associates are activated in 
a spreading fan. This is the construction stage. This spread is very rapidly limited 
by the context to one or more most likely candidates. More and deeper context 
checks occur as the reader moves ahead until contextual constraints are satisfied 
and a stable interpretation emerges in the form of a text base and a situation 
model. This is the integration stage. 
 The CI theory is not an interactive one; it is initially bottom-up without 
priming, prediction, or any inferential top-down effects from prior knowledge. 
Context effects appear later to constrain the spread of alternative meanings. For 
example, in the unfinished sentence, “Call me...”, the phrase, call me, could take a 
variety of meanings, such as a telephone call or reference by name or descriptor. 
All such associations in the reader's experience would be activated bottom-up 
without discrimination but according to their associative strengths in memory. 
Further context would rapidly strengthen the more appropriate associations and 
inhibit the less appropriate ones, as in “Call me tomorrow” or “Call me Michael” or 
“Call me irresponsible”. Two shades of meaning co-occur in the old gag, Call me 
anything but late for dinner. As a coherent propositional text base emerges through 
further reading, a situation model could also be generated by the reader. These 
modifications to the theory offered several advantages including greater sensitivity 
to ambiguity and ever-changing contexts than formal, schema-driven processing 
would allow.  
 
 
Constructing conceptual meaning 
Conceptual meaning is seen as constructed anew in each situation by 
activation in the knowledge net and the parameters imposed on that activation by 
contextual constraints. In a mental lexicon, one looks up the meaning of a word, 
but in a knowledge network there is nothing to look up, so there is no such thing as 
lexical access. The conceptual meaning of a word is not fixed but probable; 
meaning is determined by the set of activated representations in the network in a 
given situation.  
The idea that knowledge is a vast set of associations of differing strengths is 
not new and is shared by other cognitive theories (e.g., dual coding theory, 
semantic network theory). This view does not treat the meaning of words as fixed 
featural descriptions to be accessed but as an emergent quality the shades of 
which are determined by ever-changing contexts. Consistent usage in a culture 
allows us to define general meanings for dictionaries, but dictionaries are an 
external reference very different from the internal associations and references that 
occur from moment to moment in reading. Hence, the notions of lexicon and lexical 
access are misleading metaphors at best.  
This view provides a perspective on meaning that is likely to find appeal 
among those of a constructivist persuasion. This view implies that meaning is a 
flexible, probabilistic, ever-changing entity that may never be the same twice. This 
does not imply that meaning is chaotic, that we can make a text mean whatever we 
want it to, or that there are not similarities between readers' readings or within the 
same reader upon reading a text again. There are constraints to be satisfied, and 
the constraints come from our own background memories as well as the 
conventions of our societies and cultures. We use printed language for lots of 
conventional reasons where close agreement on meanings is important. But how 
our mental networks construct a text representation can vary as we vary, and part 
of that variance is the depth to which we elaborate a text representation. The 
theory of meaning advocated here is not only constructivist but also minimalist. 
Clearly, readers can study a text over and over again and construct very elaborate 
meanings for its propositions and concepts. But most of the time, in reading or 
conversation, the process of meaning construction remains shallow, not just 
because comprehenders are inherently lazy but mostly because no more is 
required. A slight knowledge elaboration of a text is usually quite sufficient for 
whatever action is intended.  
Cognition in general could be described as constraint satisfaction, 
particularly in situations that often involve verbal instructions such as problem 
solving and decision making. Following the construction-integration model, such 
cognitive acts would begin with the formation of an approximate but unintegrated 
local interpretation based on external input and the comprehender's goals and 
knowledge. This is followed by an integration phase that is essentially a constraint 
 
satisfaction process that rejects inappropriate local constructions in favor of those 
that fit together into a coherent whole. A variety of models of such processes are 
suggested for decision making, evaluation, motivation, emotion, and so on.  
We concluded that comprehending text is a cognitive act; everything about 
the reading act also occurs in cognitive acts not involving reading. We perceive 
and discriminate, analyze patterns, make tentative interpretations, predict 
outcomes, resolve uncertainties, learn, appreciate, and perform other cognitive 
acts in material that is not in text form as well as in material that is in text form. 
That is, cognition in reading is a special case of general cognition involving printed 
language. 
 
Inferences processing during reading 
The process of  creating a situation model allows readers to understand 
things that are not explicitly stated in the  text. In these sense readers will draw 
inferences about the  relation between events or the spatial relations between 
objects. For example, in comprehending the sentence, “Three turtles  were sitting 
on a log and a fish swam beneath them” readers routinely infer that the „fish swam 
beneath the log” (Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 1972). Inferences are a crucial 
aspect of language. Stevenson (1993), in a review of models of language 
comprehension, indicated that “linguistic processes are insufficient to account for 
the way we comprehend and remember sentences. Thinking, the ability to make 
inferences, is needed.” Some inference processes seem to be automatic and 
effortless yet they yield quite complex kinds of information. Other inference 
processes seem to be dependent on the goals, strategies, and contextual 
situations of the readers. Some inferences are concerned with the relatively small 
units of reading represented by words; others are concerned with much larger units 
like event structures or story outlines Similarly, during the construction of a 
situation model, readers may attempt to explain causes of events as they proceed 
through a text  (van den Broek, 1990).  
For example, imagine a narrative  in which the protagonist goes to the 
dentist one morning to get his wisdom teeth pulled. Later that  night, his cheek is 
swollen. Drawing from a rich set of life experiences, a reader can easily infer  that 
the character’s visit to the dentist caused his cheek to be swollen. Comprehension 
of a  passage therefore involves much more than the processing of individual 
sentences; it also involves  the construction of a rich representation of the situation 
to which the text refers (Hess, Foss, &  Carroll, 1995).   
Another important aspect of the construction of situation models is its 
dynamic nature. Elements can fluctuate in terms of their availability in the reader's 
working memory as the reader  proceeds through the text (Myers, O’Brien, 
Albrecht, & Mason, 1994; van den Broek, et al. 2001). To a certain extent, 
 
fluctuations of elements depend  on their function in the context of the narrative. 
For example, with respect to causal information  readers focus their attention on 
the last state or event that has causes but (as yet) no consequences in the 
preceding text (Fletcher, Hummel, & Marsolek, 1990).  
Trabasso and van den Broek (1985) suppose that during the reading of the 
first sentences of a story, the reader constructs a hypothetical world based on the 
characteristics of the hero, the place, the time, etc. This hypothetical world 
establishes a set of circumstances in the light of which the subsequent events will 
be interpreted. The possible world will change as causal changes occur, and this is 
why causal inferences are so important. Making these inferences is central to the 
"causal inferencemaker" model (Van den Broek, 1990). Inferences are made in two 
directions: backward, forward and orthogonal.  
(a). Backward inferences correspond to inferences of connection: they link 
a focal event (which has just been read) to one or more previous event(s), to 
maintain the coherence between distinct events.The backward process is subject 
to two types of constraint: the criteria required for the causal relation, and the 
availability of the information in the memory. A reader reads an event B, and tries 
to connect it with a previously read event A. If A satisfies the criteria for a causal 
relation, the process stops; if A does not comply with these criteria, there is a break 
in the coherence. Two solutions are possible: 
- either the reader finds in his/her memory one or more previously described 
events that allow him/her "to re-establish" the causal relation; 
- or the reader constructs an elaboration involving an event that is not explicit in the 
text. This elaboration must be compatible with the stored information, and depends 
(as we have already pointed out) on the reader’s knowledge of events and on 
causality in general. 
(b) When the described events generate expectations concerning what will 
happen later, this is a forward process. These inferences are not required to 
understand the text, but they can facilitate (or hinder) the treatment of subsequent 
events. Forward inferences anticipate future events by means of cataphors, the 
anticipation of the future relevance. 
Akerman & al. (1991) distinguish between two types of forward inferences: those 
connected solely to the anticipation of events, and those that also estimate the 
importance of the previous events for those that are going to occur. So, to take the 
example used by McKoon & Ratcliff (1992): "the actress fell from the 14 floor". The 
degree of sufficiency is such that it authorizes a specific expectation: "she died "; 
but if we read the sentence "the actress fell through the window", this suggests 
physical injuries but not their extent. So it is the degree of sufficiency that is going 
to determine the specificity of the inference produced. This model is based on the 
 
idea that a reader who reads a description of an event always tries to find a causal 
justification for it.  
(c) Orthogonal inferences embellish the focal statement by providing details 
or associations. 
 Most important for comprehension, the combined patterns of activation may 
result in a connecting backward inference that integrated the focal event with 
representation of the prior text. If the connecting inference provides referential and 
causal coherence, no further inferential processes are needed for comprehension, 
and the reader proceeds to the next statement.  
A more complicated situation arises when simple associations do not 
provide adequate coherence. When this happens, the lack of coherence evokes 
additional coherence-based processes. A search results, in which prior text is 
reactivated and background knowledge is accessed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 If the patterns of activation that results from the search and those that are 
based on the focal statement yield adequate anaphoric or causal, reinstatements 
or elaborative backward inferences are generated. Coherence is established, and 
the inferential process stops.  
Fig. 1. A process model of inference generation during reading (apud van den Broek, 1994)  
FORWARD 
(causal consequent) 
Inference based on the text representation 
Inference based on the backward 
knowlege 
Reinstatement 
Connecting inferences 
Focal 
statement
Associations Forward Elaboratons 
BACKWARD 
KNOWLEGE 
TEXT 
REPRESENTATION 
Backward 
Elaborations 
Orthogonal 
Elaborations 
BACKWARD 
(causal, antecedent) 
 
There are variations in the extent to which particular types of inferences or 
activations are made (Singer, 1994), and researchers have become increasingly 
interested in determining the circumstances that lead to particular inferences 
(Narvaez, van den Broek and Ruiz, 1999). A considerable number of studies have 
focused on the effects of reader characteristics on inferential activity. For example, 
inferences have been found to differ as a function of language skill (Horiba, 1990; 
Horiba, van den Broek, & Fletcher, 1993; Zwaan & Brown, 1996), reading ability 
(Wolman, 1991; Wolman, van den Broek, & Lorch, 1997), background knowledge 
(readers with expert background knowledge do more explaining; (Chi, Feltovich, & 
Glaser, 1981; Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979), and analysis (Lundeberg, 1987; 
Wineberg, 1991). 
 
Conclusions 
When we comprehend a text, understanding something we building a 
mental representations of the described state of affairs, situation models. To do so, 
we must form connections between things that were previousely disparate: the 
ideeas expressed in text and relevant prior knowledge. Comprehension implies 
forming coherent wholes of elementary perceptual and conceptual features. That 
is, we construct bottom-up, local interpretations that are integrated via constraint 
satisfaction process. 
Comprehension in the construction-integration model is an activation-based 
process that proceeds in two phases. The construction phase produces local 
sentence-level propositions using simple, context-independent rules. The 
integration phase uses a constraint satisfaction process to integrate the possibly 
incoherent set of local propositions into a coherent whole organized by higher level 
macropropositions. Many of the CI model’s predictions about anaphora resolution, 
word identification, and the generation of infernces have been empirically 
confirmed. 
The process of  creating a situation model allows readers to understand 
things that are not explicitly stated in the  text. To achieve these goals, readers will 
draw inferences about the relation between events described by the text.. 
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